On Being Not Canadian: The Social Organization of “Migrant Workers” in Canada*  

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Se fondant sur la méthode d’ethnographie institutionnelle de Dorothy E. Smith, l'auteure étudie l'organisation sociale de notre connaissance des gens catégorisés comme non-immigrants ou « travailleurs migrants ». À la suite de l'étude du Non-Immigrant Employment Authorization Program (NIEAP) du gouvernement canadien (1973), elle montre l'importance de la pratique idéologique raciste et nationaliste des États à l'endroit de l'organisation matérielle du marché du travail compétitif « canadien » dans le cadre d'un capitalisme mondial restructuré de même que la réorganisation qui en résulte des notions d'esprit national canadien. Elle montre aussi que la pratique discursive des parlementaires qui consiste à considérer certaines personnes comme des « problèmes » pour les « Canadiens » ne provient pas de l'exclusion physique de ces « étrangers » mais plutôt de leur différenciation idéologique et matérielle des Canadiens une fois qu’ils vivent et travaillent dans la société canadienne.  

Utilizing Dorothy E. Smith’s method of institutional ethnography, I investigate the social organization of our knowledge of people categorized as non-immigrants or “migrant workers.” By examining Canada’s 1973 Non-immigrant Employment Authorization Program (NIEAP), I show the importance of racist and nationalist ideological state practice to the material organization of the competitive “Canadian” labour market within a restructured global capitalism and the resultant reorganization of notions of Canadian nationhood. I show that the parliamentary discursive practice of producing certain people as “problems” for “Canadians” results not in the physical exclusion of those constructed as “foreigners” but in their ideological and material differentiation from Canadians, once such people are living and working within Canadian society.  

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Expressions such as... "foreigner"... and so on, denoting certain types of lesser or negative identities are in actuality concealed practices and forms of violence or relations of domination... This violence and its constructive or representative attempts have become so successful or hegemonic that they have become transparent—holding in place the ruler's claimed superior self, named or identified in myriad ways, and the inadequacy and inferiority of those who are ruled.
— Himani Bannerji

WITH THE INTRODUCTION OF BILL C-11 in March of 2001, the Canadian state is taking steps to increase both the "security" of Canadian borders against those represented as "unwanted intruders" and the "flexibility" of the labour force through the recruitment of (im)migrants as non-citizen, temporary workers. By expanding the issuance of temporary employment authorizations while ignoring various international human rights obligations, greatly expanding state power of detention over refugees and (im)migrants, eliminating certain appeals processes, reinforcing measures of interdiction and broadening provisions of inadmissibility, Bill C-11 can be seen as part of a long-term move that makes it more difficult for certain groups of people to enter, live and work in Canada as permanent residents and eventually formal citizens (see Canadian Council for Refugees (CCR), 2001).

Calls for greater access to temporary, non-immigrant workers have come largely from employers' organizations while demands for greater "order at the border" have come from a diverse number of sources.¹ A number of recent and highly visible cases involving the entry of people from the Global South or from the former eastern bloc countries is evidence of a growing "moral panic"² regarding border controls. The entry of 599 undocumented people from China by boat to British Columbia in the summer of 1999 or the entry of women sex workers from eastern Europe throughout the 1990s are two of the many events that have been represented as breaches of "national security" by much of the mass media.

During this time of re-organized state practices concerning the global flow of people, a number of theorists examining the role of the Canadian national state in relation to processes of globalization have argued that the

¹ A recent public opinion poll commissioned by Citizenship and Immigration Canada asked participants: "Are there too many visible minorities being allowed into the country?" Twenty-seven percent answered "yes" (The Globe and Mail, 2000). Another recent popular opinion poll found that approximately sixty percent of respondents thought that the number one priority for Canadian immigration policy should be to stop "illegal immigrants" (The Globe and Mail, 1999).

² Stuart Hall (1978 as cited in P. Gilroy, 'There Ain't No Black in the Union Jack': The Cultural Politics of Race and Nation. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987: 3) defines a "moral panic" as existing: "[when] the official reaction to a person, groups of persons or series of events is out of all proportion to the actual threat offered, when "experts," in the form of police chiefs, the judiciary, politicians and editors, perceive the threat in all but identical terms, and appear to talk "with one voice" of rates, diagnoses, prognoses and solution, when the media representations universally stress "sudden and dramatic" increases (in numbers involved or events) and "novelty" above and beyond that which a sober, realistic appraisal could sustain, then we believe it is appropriate to speak of the beginnings of a moral panic."
state has lost its once-held "sovereign" power to determine "domestic" policy (see Teeple, 1995; 2000; Panitch, 2001). In this paper, I argue that, rather than viewing national governments as having lost control over the "domestic" or "national" space, a reorganized regulation of the international migration of labour along with a revamped nation building project has been part of how processes of globalization have been organized in Canada.

It is thus important to investigate how the Canadian state has been active in both the making of the "problem" of international migration as well as in formulating responses to it. The international migration of people has doubled since the mid-1980s (United Nations Population Fund, 1993). The numbers of people entering Canada with or without legal documents has also increased in this period. Despite this, it is still accurate to say that Canadian state policies on immigration have become increasingly restrictive over the last two decades (see Simmons, 1996). These growing restrictions, however, should not be seen as resulting in a drop in the numbers of (im)migrants entering and staying in Canada. Rather, restriction measures have been taken largely in how people are able to cross borders—not whether they are able to cross or not (Sharma, 1995; Michalowski, 1996).

In this paper, I will show that the ideology of border control so prevalent in Canada (and other countries in the Global North) over this latest period of globalization has worked not necessarily to exclude people but to cheapen the labour power of a growing number of people once they are inside the country and to leave them increasingly vulnerable to all forms of market relations. Such concerted state practices have been an important part of how nationalized labour markets have become "globally competitive" over the last several decades (see Sassen, 1988; Gardezi, 1995).

In this paper, I emphasize the importance of notions of Canadian "nation-ness" in maintaining nation-state power in the present era of globalization (see Anderson, 1991 for a discussion on "nation-ness" as an ideology). As I have argued elsewhere, borders are both physical and existent (Sharma, 2000a). They define material as well as ideological ground. In other words, the construction of the borders or boundaries of

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3. A thorough examination of the growing body of literature debating the role of national states within processes of globalization is beyond the scope of this paper (see N. Sharma, "The social organization of 'difference' and capitalist restructuring in Canada: The making of 'migrant workers' through the 1973 Non-immigrant Employment Authorization Program (NIEAP)." Ph.D. dissertation. Ontario Institute for Studies in Education at the University of Toronto, May, 2000: 69-121).

4. The occurrence of calls to "protect our borders" in Canada is not limited to this latest period of globalization. Indeed, it can be said that such calls are related both to who is crossing into Canadian territory as well as in which historical period (see F. Iacovetta, "Making new Canadians: Social workers, women, and the reshaping of immigrant families," in F. Iacovetta and M. Valverde (eds.) Gender Conflicts: New Essays in Women’s History, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1995, p. Chart, The Gender of Breadwinners: Women, Men, and Change in Two Industrial Towns, 1890–1950. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990; G. Creese, "Exclusion or solidarity? Vancouver workers confront the 'oriental problem'," B.C. Studies, No. 90 (Winter), pp. 24–51.)
the nation-state affects people's legal-political "rights" as well as the formation of people's consciousness of who "belong" and perhaps more importantly, of those that do not.

The view of the Self as insider and the Other as foreigner or outsider that nationalist practices aimed at "protecting our borders" organize, consequently helps to naturalize the nation-state system and profoundly shape both material reality as well as a particular ideological understanding of social relationships amongst people. I argue that continued reference to protecting the "nation," and by extension those seen as "belonging" to it, allows those working within the apparatuses of the Canadian state to reorganize the labour market in Canada by recruiting workers categorized as "non-immigrants" (or in the vernacular, as "migrant workers").

The social organization of those categorized as non-immigrants works to legitimize the differentiation of rights and entitlements in Canada along citizen/non-citizen lines by legalizing the indentureship of people classified as migrant workers. However, instead of taking the notion of legitimacy for granted, so that actual state practices are left unexamined, I investigate how it is that the Canadian state works at shaping people's consciousness around the boundaries of "Canadianness" in ways that contribute to the "common-sense" realization of the category migrant workers.

My examination of five years of parliamentary debates in the House of Commons during the years 1969 to 1973 allows me to focus on the creation and organization of the category of migrant worker. I investigate how the social relations and practices that organize this category have normalized the denial of rights and entitlements for people so classified. Necessarily, then, I also investigate the social organization of people's consciousness around notions of Canadianness during this time, for it, perhaps more than any other concept organized by national state practices, helps to shape people's common sense of the "imagined community" of Canada (Anderson, 1991).

I argue that acceptance of the oppositional categories of citizen/migrant worker helps to secure the organization of "difference" within Canada, where difference does not mean diversity but inequality. The notion of citizen, then, needs to be understood as the dominant, oppressive half of a binary code of negative dualities. As such, the notion of citizenship is not a philosophical absolute but the mark of a particular

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5. I am placing the term migrant worker within quotes to emphasize its socially organized character. I will forego the use of this practice, but I continue to problematize it throughout this paper.

6. I am using the notion of "common sense" in ways similar to that of Antonio Gramsci (1971). In this regard, Rosana Ng points out that the notion of common sense allows us to make "good sense" of the "inhomogeneous and at times contradictory assumptions and beliefs held by the mass of the population." (1998: 92). She adds that "treat[ing] racism and sexism as "common sense" draws attention to the norms and forms of action that have become ordinary ways of doing things, of which we have little consciousness." (1998: 92). The Gramscian use of the term "common sense," thus, is used to refer to notions that have become naturalized or normalized. Therefore, when something is said to be commonsensical, it is understood to have become a hegemonic world view in a particular place and time.
kind of relationship that people have with one another (see Arat-Koc, 1992; Brown, 1995).

Thus, while there is a growing body of literature examining the working conditions and (direct) employment relations of various groups of migrant workers in Canada, more attention needs to be paid to how the very categorization of people as migrant workers assists in the restructuring of the labour market in Canada (see Bakan and Stasiulis, 1996; Bolaria, 1992; Wall, 1992 for a discussion of migrant workers in specific occupational sectors). In this paper, then, I place the state-organized category of migrant worker at the centre of my inquiry.

Since Canadian immigration policies increasingly emphasize the recruitment of workers admitted on temporary employment authorizations, uncovering the social practices that organize people as migrant workers sheds some light on how concepts of national citizenship are employed in this period of globalization. By examining how parliamentarians in the period 1969 to 1973 organized legitimacy for the creation of a non-immigrant or migrant worker category that strips people of most of the human, civil and other "rights" of citizenship available to "Canadians", we are also in a better position to examine contemporary state practices concerning the regulation of global flows of labour, as well as capital.

Methodological Approach

In order to understand the social organization of the category migrant worker, I take two related methods of investigation developed by Dorothy E. Smith. The first approach, institutional ethnography, gives me a way of uncovering how people working within ruling institutions, such as departments of state, organize both the creation as well as the general (though by no means complete) legitimacy of the category migrant worker within Canada. Investigating state institutions in this way allows us to understand how certain "problems" are arrived at and certain "solutions" formulated. It also allows us to see how these state practices further shape people's knowledge of each other.

Smith's method of institutional ethnography, complemented by the work of Michel Foucault (1966) on how power "reaches into the very grain of individuals, touches their bodies and inserts itself into their actions and attitudes, their discourses, learning processes and everyday lives," allows us to see that it is how social relations are organized within a given social formation that makes some actions appear to be "natural" (or at least unproblematic) for those that do the job of governing and for (at least some of) those who are governed. This approach, then, uncovers how legitimacy is actually organized.

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7. Smith's (1990) emphasis on investigating textual practices and Michel Foucault's genealogical method (i.e., examining the historical, political and economic circumstances that produce certain discourses)
Utilizing the method of institutional ethnography allows me to connect these actions to the broader Canadian social formation. This method is centered on the understanding that the decisions made by those who govern are part of a larger set of social relations that exist in Canada (and beyond) rather than simply isolated acts taken by a few people with their peculiar idiosyncrasies (see Ng, 1995: 21). This makes it possible for us to see that the construction of state categories is not a benign or supposedly natural selection process but an essential constituent of what Smith calls the "relations of ruling."

Through the use of the institutional ethnography method, I try to uncover how Canada's Non-immigrant Employment Authorization Program (NIEAP) produces people as migrant workers for the Canadian labour market. I then examine how the operation of category allows for the reproduction of existing relations of ruling, thereby making it an "appropriate" technique of governing in Canada.

Since one of the essential components of the study is an investigation of how the category migrant worker is organized in such a way as to deny those so classified many of the "rights" and "entitlements" available to "Canadians" and legitimate the effects of this categorization, it is also necessary to make what Smith calls "ideological practices" an object of my inquiry. Smith, following from Karl Marx (1977), uses the term ideology to refer not only to a bias or a set of beliefs but to a method of ruling (1990: 45). "Ideology," Smith (1990: 35) argues, "names a kind of practice in thinking about society" which reframes and gives primacy to categories over the social relations that arise in and from people's activities.

Ideological practices, then, are those human activities which leave the relations of ruling in which people's experiences are embedded out of view and out of analytical scope. A critical part of the organized co-ordination of ideological practices thus occurs in the active shaping of human consciousness. Ideological practices work in such a way that people not only gain a certain kind of consciousness about their co-ordinated activities, but also, often, the very fact of co-ordinating this knowledge is suppressed.

are, in my opinion, compatible for they contribute to "making the familiar visible, unnatural and problematic" (Wang, 1990: 60). However, it is important to remember that in their totality the works of Smith, Foucault, and Foucault are not necessarily compatible. While it is not my purpose here to examine the tensions between their work, key issues that hinder any ready synthesis of their works include whether or not Foucault's discourse theory is compatible with (diverse) Marxist theories of ideology. However, Frank Wang (1998) has demonstrated that the work of Smith and Foucault can be used together to better understand the social organization of knowledge and relations of ruling, or governance. In particular, both Smith and Foucault see discourses not merely as linguistic statements but as social processes. Likewise, while there is disagreement on use of the term ideology for both ideology and power produces subjectivities, as well as knowledge and its objectification, i.e. the production of "fetishity" (see D.P. Smith, The Conceptual Practices of Power: A Feminist Sociology of Knowledge, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990: 70-71) or "truth" (see C. Gordon, "Government rationality: an introduction," in The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality, G. Burchill, C. Gordon and P. Miller (eds.), Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991: 8). Moreover, both recognize that institutional practices, either the textual practices of Smith (1990) or the disciplinary practices of Foucault (1991), work to legitimize certain discourses or knowledge while working to exclude alternative ones.
These two approaches (institutional ethnography and ideological practices as an object of inquiry) are integrally related, for, together, they help us to uncover the social co-ordination of the relations of ruling in which migrant workers are located. In the context of this methodology, conducting an analysis of textual practices proves useful. As Smith (1990: 144) says, "[w]e cannot find an everyday world beyond the categories without examining the organizational processes that do the work of transposing actual happenings, experiences, goings-on, events, states of affairs as actualities, into an objectified system of records defining and defined by the jurisdiction and objectives of formal organization."

Conducting a textual analysis, however, is not an exercise in finding some supposedly “correct” interpretation of reality. The text is not read for what it reveals. Rather, "... texts are seen as constituents of social relations, and hence, by exploring our own knowledge of how to operate the interrelations among them, we explicate both our own practices and a segment of the social relations in which those practices are embedded and which they organize" (Smith, 1990: 149). Textual analysis, in other words, uncovers the ideological practices that produce a certain kind of knowledge practical to the task of ruling (also see Foucault, 1980).

I have chosen to focus on the debates engaged in by parliamentarians within the House of Commons in order to investigate the particular state ideological practices that have helped to naturalize the category migrant worker. The discursive practices of parliamentarians have been chosen because parliamentary debates, although not synonymous with ruling relations or state power, are a form of construction of knowledge through state practices, a form particularly attentive to the performative aspects of state authority and power.

While not always part of the formation of the specificity of state policy directives, parliamentary debates shape the discursive framework in which such policy is established. Parliamentary debates constitute a site where a certain kind of discursive practice is put together. They actively re-shape, recreate and redefine social reality. They also have great power in constructing and legitimizing state categories. Parliamentary debates, in other words, are consequential for action. For one thing, the discursive practices of parliamentarians get entered into the work process of state apparatuses.

An analysis of the discursive practices of parliamentarians is particularly useful for making visible how ideological practices of ruling are performed. In the context of Canada’s liberal democracy the performance of

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5. The Canadian Parliament is made up of two separate Houses, the House of Commons and the Senate. In the House of Commons, Members of Parliament (MPs) are voted into office by eligible members of their electoral district. Senators, on the other hand, are appointed by the Prime Minister and hold office until the age of 75. Members of either House can initiate legislation, but this is predominantly done by MPs within the House of Commons. In order for legislation to be enacted, both Houses of Parliament must accept it by majority vote. After having been accepted in both Houses, new acts of legislation must receive formal royal assent. From here on, I refer to people elected to the House of Commons as either parliamentarians or MPs.
parliamentary rituals, particularly the daily Question Period where debate between MPs of different political parties are conducted, are especially productive of notions of nation that legitimate the wielding of state power. Indeed, Adam Ashforth (1990: 11) questions whether it would not be more useful for us to interpret public performances of this type ". . . less as instruments of "policy" and "intelligence" and more as symbolic rituals aiding in establishing and reproducing the power of modern states."

Parliamentary debates, in this sense, can be seen as a technology of liberal democratic forms of ruling that discursively reconstitutes the social process of restructuring ruling relations into a form that normalizes the exercise of state power (Foucault, 1991). As Kari Dehli (1993: 87) points out, such discursive state practices have "consequences beyond the contexts in which they are written and read." The discursive practices of parliamentarians actively organize a particular frame for reading (and hearing) the debates whereby a certain kind of "knowledge" helpful to the accomplishment of ruling is produced (Smith, 1990). Part of the work done by such discourses, then, is to provide a framework in which people come to think about the issues parliamentarians selectively choose to debate. A textual analysis of these debates, then, is more than an interpretation of the utterances of parliamentarians: it is an attempt to uncover the social relations that allow such utterances to make "common sense."

Citizenship and (Im)migration in Canada: The Social Organization of Migrant Workers

The state's active participation in the discourse of "protecting Our borders," especially from women and men from the Global South, has been key in the process of "nation"-building during the beginning stages (late 1960s to early 1970s) of this most recent period of capitalist restructuring. Indeed, the work of continuously reimagining Canada features prominently in the discourse concerning proper state practices during this time. In this regard, discursive practices of formulating immigration policy can be said to refract issues of racialized, gendered and nationalized inclusions/exclusions and their relationship to entitlements and disentitlements within Canadian society.

Such practices are of special consequence for the reorganization of the labour market in Canada (see Ng, 1988; Brand, 1993). This is perhaps most apparent when looking at the experiences of those categorized as migrant workers and who, as a result, are made to work in unfree employment relationships as a condition of entering, residing and working in Canada. People so categorized enter through Canada's Non-immigrant

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9. Although traditional political science approaches see MPs of the governing party but not the opposition parties as part of the Government, which is analyzed separately from other state apparatuses, I believe it is more fruitful to view the MPs of all political parties as participating in state activities, especially in discursive activities concerned with legitimizing state power.
Employment Authorization Program (NIEAP) established in 1973. The Canadian system of migrant-worker recruitment raises a number of points that include different elements of ideological practices that make and legitimize the differential categories of citizen and non-citizen (in this case, the non-immigrant).

It needs to be clearly stated, however, that not all persons admitted to the country under this program can be considered unfree wage workers and that the Non-immigrant Employment Authorization Program should not be considered as only a labour-recruitment program (Wong, 1984; Michalowski, 1996). Instead, it is heterogeneous in nature. For instance, a large number of the people admitted stay only for a very short period of time to do work that normally crosses many national borders and can not be considered to be working as unfree wage labour in the country. These people fall under the following occupational categories: entrepreneurs; artistic, literary, performing arts and related; and sports and recreation professionals, as well as those with “not stated” occupations on their employment authorizations.

The inclusion of people admitted under these categories in the data on migrant workers in Canada has often been cited as a reason to dismiss claims that the Non-immigrant Employment Authorization Program operates as a system of forced, rotational, unfree contract-labour recruitment (Boyd, 1986). Therefore, for the purposes of the present study, out of the total number of people annually issued temporary employment authorizations, those admitted under the above categories are omitted from any statistics presented. Once removed from the data, it becomes evident that such complete dismissals are ungrounded: approximately 75% of those entering through the NIEAP are engaged in non-professional occupations (Sharma, 1996: 128).10

For these workers, stipulations regarding the criteria for entering under the NIEAP include having the name of the employer and the location, type, condition and length of employment pre-arranged and stated on the person’s temporary employment authorization form prior to arrival in Canada. The person classified as the worker within this process of creating what Smith (1995: 2) calls a “documentary reality” is then bound to “...work at a specific job for a specific period of time for a specific employer” (Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC), 1994). Migrant workers are unable to change any of their conditions of entry or employment without receiving written permission from an immigration officer. If s/he leaves the stipulated employer or changes occupations without the approval of the government, for instance, s/he is subject to deportation.

10. In 1973, the top three occupational groupings employing unfree contract labour were service (17.9%), farming (13.3%) and fabricating, assembly and repair (11.4%). Together these three occupations accounted for approximately 42% of all jobs filled that year (CIC, 1995). Ten years later, in 1983, service (23%), farming (5.5%) and fabricating, assembly and repair (15.3%) accounted for about 52% of all temporary visa workers (CIC, 1995). In 1993, the service industry (11.3%) and the farming sector (14.1%) were in the top three of all occupational groupings (CIC, 1995). Fabricating, assembly and repair remained in the top five of all occupations employing unfree contract workers.
Under the regulations of the NIEAP, workers cannot stay in Canada beyond the length of time stated upon their temporary employment authorization form. They are, however, able to renew what the immigration department (CIC, 1994) calls their “foreign worker” visa if the employer agrees. Even for those who are able to successfully do so, however, a migrant worker’s status in Canada is permanently temporary. This is because people classified as migrant workers cannot apply for permanent residency (or “landed”) status. Different people are brought in to work and subsequently expelled to be replaced by others. In this sense, it can be stated that the NIEAP operates as a “revolving door of exploitation” (Ramirez, 1982: 17).

As Table 1 shows, there have been some significant fluctuations in both the numbers and percentages of the total number of people entering as either permanent residents or as temporary, migrant workers over the period 1973 to 1993. One clear trend emerges from the data, however. Through the implementation of the NIEAP, the Canadian government has successfully shifted its immigration policy away from a policy of permanent (im)migrant settlement towards an increasing reliance upon unfree, temporary labour.12

In 1973, 57% of all people classified as workers “destined” to enter the “Canadian” workforce came with permanent resident status.13 By 1993, of the total number of workers admitted to Canada in 1993, only 30% received this status while 70% came in as migrant workers on temporary employment authorizations.14

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11. After sustained struggle from domestic workers and their allies, those (mainly women of colour) entering through the various domestic workers recruitment schemes (the latest being the Live-in Caregiver Program) are able to apply for (but are by no means guaranteed) permanent-residency status if they have met certain criteria, including having worked for two years in continuous employment as an indentured domestic worker in Canada. However, the numbers of migrant workers entering through this program are but a tiny fraction of all migrant workers recruited to work in Canada and even these numbers are now in decline (see N. Sharma, “The true north strong and unfree: Capitalist restructuring and Non-immigrant employment in Canada, 1973-1993.” Master’s thesis, Simon Fraser University: Burnaby, B.C. 1995; A. Bakan and D.R. Stasiulis, “Structural adjustment, citizenship, and foreign domestic labour: The Canadian case,” in Rethinking Restructuring: Gender and Change in Canada. I. Bakker (ed.). Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1995).

12. Margaret Michelowski (1996: 110) has shown that the figures presented on the Non-immigrant Employment Authorization Program represent the number of people granted temporary work visas, rather than the number of visas issued. The numbers do not include multiple visa issuance to the same person. In other words, the number of people entering on temporary work visas is recorded and not the number of jobs employing un-free wage workers in Canada.

13. “Destined” refers to the number of people admitted to Canada as permanent residents who have indicated that they intend to enter the labour market. This category includes people admitted under all classes of immigrants (family refugees, self-employed, retired, assisted relative and independent). These people have the right to choose their occupation, their employer and their location of residence. In other words, they are able to work as free wage workers within Canada. This category excludes: entrepreneurs who were added to this category from 1978 and investors who were included from 1988.

14. “Visa” refers to the number of people admitted to Canada for periods less than or over one year and working in Canada during the calendar year recorded. The total of visa workers includes workers entering through the NIEAP plus the Foreign Domestic Movement Program (1982-1991) and the Live-in Caregiver Program (1992-1993). For the years 1988-1993, the category “backlog clearance,” given to refugees granted temporary employment authorizations while waiting for their status to be determined, is also excluded.
### Table 1

**Total Number of (Im)migrant Workers in the Canadian Labour Market by Calendar Year:**
Permanent Residents "Destined" to the Labour Market and Temporary Visa Workers, 1973 to 1993

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Destined (Immigrant Workers)</th>
<th>Visa (&quot;Non-immigrant&quot; Workers)</th>
<th>Total (All (Im)migrant Workers)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>92,228 (57%)</td>
<td>69,901 (43%)</td>
<td>162,129 (100%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>106,083 (60)</td>
<td>71,773 (40)</td>
<td>177,856 (100)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>81,189 (51)</td>
<td>77,149 (49)</td>
<td>158,338 (100)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>61,461 (47)</td>
<td>69,368 (53)</td>
<td>130,829 (100)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>47,625 (41)</td>
<td>67,130 (59)</td>
<td>114,755 (100)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>34,762 (71)</td>
<td>14,459 (29)</td>
<td>49,221 (100)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>47,949 (60)</td>
<td>31,996 (40)</td>
<td>79,945 (100)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>63,479 (39)</td>
<td>98,681 (61)</td>
<td>162,160 (100)</td>
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<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>56,676 (37)</td>
<td>96,760 (63)</td>
<td>153,436 (100)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>55,023 (35)</td>
<td>101,509 (65)</td>
<td>156,532 (100)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>36,540 (29)</td>
<td>87,760 (71)</td>
<td>124,240 (100)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>37,468 (25)</td>
<td>113,297 (75)</td>
<td>150,765 (100)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>36,949 (22)</td>
<td>134,167 (75)</td>
<td>171,116 (100)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>63,479 (30)</td>
<td>150,467 (70)</td>
<td>213,946 (100)</td>
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<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>56,676 (26)</td>
<td>157,492 (74)</td>
<td>214,168 (100)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>73,134 (27)</td>
<td>194,464 (73)</td>
<td>267,598 (100)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>94,412 (36)</td>
<td>169,004 (64)</td>
<td>263,416 (100)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>109,840 (35)</td>
<td>176,377 (62)</td>
<td>286,217 (100)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>127,870 (40)</td>
<td>191,392 (60)</td>
<td>318,262 (100)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>137,360 (43)</td>
<td>178,280 (57)</td>
<td>315,640 (100)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>65,130 (30)</td>
<td>153,988 (70)</td>
<td>218,118 (100)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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a. This category includes all those entering the country under the above "destined" and "visa" categories.

Through the use of the NIEAP the Canadian state has, to a great extent, controlled the scale, structure and course of labour migration into Canada and has contributed to the creation of a highly flexible (i.e., precarious) labour force. In other words, the Canadian state, through the regulations of the NIEAP, has produced a category of people in Canada that we have come to know as migrant workers.

What allows migrant workers to be used as a cheap and largely unprotected form of labour power are not any inherent qualities of the
people so categorized but state regulations that render them powerless (see Sassen, 1988; also Sharma, 1997). Since they have been categorized as non-immigrants, people admitted as migrant workers do not have many of the either de facto or de jure social, economic or political rights associated with Canadian citizenship. For instance, because they can not stay in the country other than to work for a pre-specified employer; migrant workers do not have the ability to access a wide array of social programs and services associated with the entitlements in the Northern welfare states.

Access to these programs and services would provide migrant workers with an alternative to selling their labour power (as it does to those Canadian citizens and permanent residents who are able to access them). However, this would go against the express purpose of their recruitment—to work as unfree labour in the Canadian labour market. In other words, they would no longer be migrant workers. Aside from being denied the ability to make changes through Canada’s political system (e.g., voting), these workers are placed in a highly vulnerable situation in regards to speaking out for their rights. This is due to the fact that if either the employer or the state finds the worker unsuitable, s/he is subject to deportation (Wall, 1992).

By introducing the NIEAP in 1973, we see, then, that another dimension of coercive state control over certain peoples has been added. This program represents new restrictive conditions of entry for people filtered through it and connects the concepts of citizenship and nationality to a bureaucratic course of action, as well as to the resources of the state (see Ng, 1995; Smith, 1990). While migrant workers are expressly recruited for their contributions to the Canadian labour market, governmental practices categorize them as being part of a foreign labour force. The dual construction of a “domestic” and a “foreign” labour market within the space occupied by Canada is accomplished through the category migrant worker.

The operation of the migrant worker category can substantially enhance the ability of the Canadian government to attract and/or retain capital investment in its territory by giving employers in the country (whether they are so-called domestic or foreign capitalists) access to a “cheap labour strategy” of global competition (Swanson, 2001). Indeed, capitalist investment has been a key concern of the government during this period of capitalist restructuring. Days after the introduction of regulations that legalized the NIEAP on January 1, 1973, the Liberal govern-
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ment led by Pierre Elliot Trudeau laid down the following priorities in its annual Speech From the Throne:

...The Government will introduce legislation establishing a competition policy to preserve and strengthen the market system upon which our economy is based. The new policy will be in harmony with industrial policies in general and foreign investment policy in particular (Hansard, 4 January 1973a: 5).

The migrant workers recruitment program can be said to be situated within the government's stated desire to "strengthen the market system" in Canada and attract capital investment, for it helps to (re)organize a particular kind of labour market in Canada. The operation of the NIEAP enables those in the Canadian government to produce a group of non-citizens who, because of their classification as "non-immigrants," can legally be exempted from laws on minimum employment standards, collective bargaining and the provision of social services and programs such as unemployment insurance, social assistance, old-age pensions, etc. This, in turn, cheapens and weakens the position of these workers. Citizenship, then, has become an important tool in reorganizing the labour market in Canada to the benefit of capital investors (Sherma, 2000d). This can be seen in the even greater emphasis given to recruiting people as temporary migrant workers in Bill C-11, introduced to revamp existing immigration policies (see Sharma, 2000b).

However, while the statistics I have compiled and the immigration regulations I have outlined show the material effects of employing the NIEAP in Canada and the conditions under which migrant workers are made to live and work, they do not, by themselves, explain how it is that the government can create a category of non-citizens, such as migrant workers, with relatively little outcry and, even, tacit support from much of the remaining population living and working in Canada. In order to uncover the social and ideological practices that allow for the existence of a group of people we know as migrant workers in Canada, there is a need to examine state practices, particularly the work done in Parliamentary debates, that aid in the construction of the co-ordinated ideological frames embedded in the concept of "Canadianness" during this early period of capitalist reorganization. I argue that the construction of a new, "tolerant"

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10. It is important to note that while the federal government of Canada regulates the entry of people on temporary employment authorizations, the ten provincial governments regulate migrant workers' access to a wide variety of social programs, services, benefits and protections. Therefore, there exists throughout Canada a patchwork of differential access to welfare state provisions for migrant workers. Generally, though, migrant workers are denied access to those programs that provide an alternative to paid employment, e.g., unemployment insurance, welfare, etc.

17. To understand the scope of this passivity, imagine the outcry if all Canadian citizens who were accountants, university professors or autoworkers were legally indentured to their employers and faced harsh penalties for quitting or changing their jobs. Imagine, too, the outcry if all were denied access to minimum employment standards, ability to organize into unions or social programs and services.
Canadian identity during this time, especially in regards to people of colour and particularly in the area of immigration, worked to secure the racist and sexist operation of the capitalist labour market in which the organization of the category of migrant worker is referenced.

**Ideological Textual Practices**

At the same time that an indentured labour system was being entrenched within Canadian citizenship and immigration policy, the notion of Canada as a tolerant and even a "just" society was being organized. Indeed, one of the striking features of immigration policy-making at this time was the practically simultaneous liberalization and restriction of access to Canadian citizenship. On the one hand, the Canadian government removed *explicitly* racist restrictions on immigration from the South in 1967 through regulatory changes (see Satzewich, 1989). On the other hand, in 1973 the NIEAP was introduced, which served to deny some people access to Canadian entitlements while recruiting them to work in Canada.

This was accomplished through a threefold process, including the further exploitation of the valuable currency of liberal philosophy already embedded within notions of Canadian parliamentary "democracy," selectively reporting accounts so that the NIEAP was rendered more-or-less invisible while the supposedly tolerant Canadian society was highlighted, as well as reproducing (and reworking) commonsensical notions of the entitlements of Canadianness (and, hence, the disentitlements of non-Canadianness) established over time (see Creese, 1988; Abele and Stasiulis, 1989).

By conducting a textual analysis of transcripts (the Hansard) of parliamentary debates both before, during and after the time the NIEAP was introduced in 1973, it is clear that the discursive practices of parliament helped in organizing an ideological understanding of Canadian identity. Indeed, key to the maintenance of legitimacy for coercive state actions at the time the NIEAP was introduced was the reshaping of an identity that was tolerant but still very much exclusionary. Important to this work were the ways in which certain groups of people continued to be excluded from the definition of "Canadian," yet how their exclusion was concealed through the organization of a false, "virtual reality" (Smith, 1990: 62).

The erasure of the colonial and racist foundations of Canada was a key, initial step in the presentation of Canada as a tolerant society. The construction of Canadianness during this period was one where the Canadian national state was portrayed as having sprung into existence through the *overthrowing of colonialism*. This supposedly anti-colonial struggle was waged by the two "founding" English and French "nations" (earlier referred to as founding "races"). In this account, the reality of
Canada being built on the colonisation of Aboriginal peoples and lands by these same people was nowhere in evidence.

This virtual reality was presented in the House of Commons equally well by members of the different political parties. The following quote from David Lewis, Member of Parliament (MP) from York South and soon to be leader of the federal New Democratic Party was representative of how Canada came to be constituted as a previously colonized—not colonizing—national state. In speaking of the importance of establishing good relations with “developing” countries in order to foster “international competitiveness,” he stated:

. . . from all our contacts and all our reading we know Canada has a special place of trust among the developing nations. We emerged as an independent nation almost a century before them, but we also emerged out of colonial status. We have never [had] an imperial goal or imperialistic intentions (Hansard, 20 January 1969; emphasis added).

Another episode shaping this virtual reality was found in the following statement by Conservative Party MP, Heath Macquarrie, who, speaking in support for the creation of a new statutory holiday, Canada Day, stated:

. . . A national day in any country reverts back to a time of great achievement. . . . The great moment in Canadian history, one which reflects its unique character among nations, is surely that it has achieved nationhood by peaceful means, by the getting together of different communities. . . . (Hansard, 17 February 1970: 3702; emphasis added).

Again, the continuing violence of colonialism against Aboriginal peoples was erased in favour of a Canadianness represented as “peaceful.” Macquarrie’s comments organized a particular kind of knowledge whereby the English and French empires did not colonize Aboriginal peoples but “got together” with them.

This allowed for an ideological reading of being Canadian, one that obscured the continued substandard conditions under which most Aboriginal peoples continued to live in Canada and one which removed any responsibility for this reality by the English and French colonists (see Frideres, 1988; Goodleaf, 1995). The work that these texts, in part, did then was to have us, their readers (see-ers, hear-ers) come to know Canada (and, hence, Canadians) as bearing no responsibility for the existence of certain oppressive and exploitative social relations. This is where various readers come to be differentiated according to their experiences of being a colonizer or being colonized, being included in things Canadian or being excluded.

Significantly, part of the creation of the tolerant Canadian nation at this time was the exclusion of references to the process of racialization,
hence, nowhere was the term "white" attached to being Canadian. This was key to the process of ruling in this period of Canadian society. As neither the Self nor the Other was identified explicitly, we can say an agreement was struck between the producers and (some of the) readers of these texts that allowed reference to the tolerant Canadian to work ideologically to maintain existing relations of ruling while denying them altogether. Not naming who benefited from the existence of Canada allowed for the continuation of these benefits while working to deny complaints from those who were kept from them.

Yet, liberal rhetoric aside, the racialized meaning(s) of Canadianness remained embedded within these concepts. This is evident in the following statement by then Prime Minister, Pierre Trudeau, on a report of a Royal Commission on National Security. In addressing parliament at a time when the immigration of people from the South was increasing steadily and commonsensical ideas of being an immigrant were being conflated with being a person of colour, he stated:

As the commissioners have stated, and I quote: "Canada remains the target of subversive or potentially subversive activities, attempts at infiltration and penetration, and espionage operations" and they emphasize that: "the duty of the state to protect its secrets from espionage, its information from subversion and its policies from clandestine influence is indisputable; what are matters for dispute are the organizations and procedures established by the State to meet this responsibility in an area which can touch closely upon the fundamental freedoms of the individual."...[This requires] a careful and methodical build-up of modern technical facilities directed toward the detection and prevention of large-scale organized crime, as well as the provision of information which the government requires in order to ensure the security and integrity of the state. ... For this reason ... the government ... has decided to accept the commissioners' recommendation for the establishment of a Security Review Board. ... It is their opinion that such a system of review might be required in the three areas of employment, immigration and citizenship (Hansard, 26 June 1969: 10836–37, emphasis added).

The PM.'s comments signal that citizenship and immigration had become a "security issue" for Canadians and that it was somehow connected to policies on employment. However, Trudeau was careful to recognize, and emphasize, liberal notions of individual freedoms within the context of selecting entire groups, i.e. immigrants, for special attention. In this regard it is significant that there is an association made between citizenship and immigration and the issue of employment (and, hence, unemployment) in the context of identifying national security issues. Without saying "Canadians are under threat from people from the South who will take away Our jobs", Trudeau was able to racialize the
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"problems" facing Canadians while maintaining a public image of tolerance. This was done by making immigration a national problem, rather than a systemic one, as well as by leaving out positive comments regarding immigrants and immigration.

To understand the way that readers can read such notions from the text, it is crucial to remember that each statement was not made in isolation from previous ones. Images of which racialized and gendered bodies "belong" in Canada and which do not are littered throughout the history of governing Canada (see Ward, 1978; Creese, 1988; Bourgeault, 1989). Parliamentary discourse can "quietly borrow" (to use a term of Dorothy Smith's) from this history to frame the topic of the entrance of certain people as a "problem" worthy of being called a national security issue. What was identified as a risk by parliamentarians, then, was the identity of the imagined Canadian nation as white. This risk, we were told, came from "immigrants" and since the parliamentary representation of immigrants was that of people entering from the Global South, Our "problem" became people of colour who threatened the Canadian character of the state.

The liberal framework, then, can actually be said to strengthen the racist meanings of concepts of Canadianness for they work to naturalize the very categories of difference that the state participates fully in organizing. Within the liberal framework, legitimacy is secured by enshrining the rights of those who are placed (and have placed themselves) within categories that privilege them in relation to Others who are placed within far more inferior categories, such as migrant worker. Liberal practices allow for the "protection of individual freedoms" but only for those that the state vows to protect. Those falling outside of this category are then seen to be legitimately denied the state's protection. They are the ones from whom We are to be protected. It can even come to be accepted that this leaves these Others open as targets for state coercive practices designed to strengthen Us.

In this regard, it is important that even while the Other is ideologically differentiated from the "norm," the construction of binary codes is intimately connected to the establishment and reproduction of unequal materialities, so that those who are categorized as "different" (from Canadians) do become truly differentiated in relation to resources and power, as is the case with migrant workers. This gives social meaning, and not a small modicum of plausibility, to notions that actual differences exist. Our consciousness of ourselves and Others and our respective places in the world are shaped by the fact that we can see that there are tangible consequences stemming from belonging to differently constructed group categories. This is evident in the following discussion that took place in Canada's parliament under the topic of Manpower: Use of unemployed and students instead of West Indians to pick fruit.
Mr. Gérard Laprise (Abitibi): Mr. Speaker, I have a question for the PM. A few days ago, the Minister of Manpower and Immigration announced that seasonal workers from the West Indies would be hired this summer to help in picking and canning fruits and vegetables in Ontario. Could the PM then consider the possibility of assigning this work to our unemployed or to our students who for the most part will not find jobs this summer (Hansard, 23 March 1971: 4508)?

Through his choice of words, Laprise operationalized the negative dualities of us—Canadians/them—West Indians or migrant workers. As we will see, it was also of great import that Mr. Laprise used the word “assign.” The PM (Mr. Trudeau) responded by stating:

Mr. Speaker, this is a perennial problem and it must be recognized that this is a type of work that very often students or unemployed will not do. This is why the Department of Manpower and Immigration is admitting foreign workers on our labour market. Should students be willing to undertake this work, they would certainly have the preference. I am not cognizant with the specific case the honourable member is referring to, but I know that this is a problem which comes up year after year with respect to certain types of work (Hansard, 23 March 1971: 4508, emphasis added).

The “problem,” then, was at least partly identified as one of filling jobs that we Canadians do not want. The PM’s statement not only activates notions of less entitlement regarding workers from the West Indies but it, again, operationalizes binary notions of us/them. To this, Mr. Laprise responds with a supplementary question:

Would the PM consider inviting the young people to do that work during the holidays, not only in Ontario where fruit and vegetables are grown, but in every province? This would be much more efficient than having them travel” (Hansard, 23 March 1971: 4508).

Mr. Trudeau: Mr. Speaker, I agree with the hon. member on that score. The purpose of the Manpower Centres is to send the unemployed or the students to take part in this work. But, once again, facts reveal that there are in Canada some types of work which the unemployed and the students refuse to do; this proves, by the way, that the rate of unemployment is at times somewhat artificial” (Hansard, 23 March 1971: 4508).

Once again, the comments by the PM help to ideologically reframe the recruitment of migrant workers as coming to work at jobs that Canadians will not (normally) take. Why? Because of low wages, unsafe and unacceptable working conditions, the seasonal character of the work, etc. (see Wall, 1992). However, this reality is eclipsed by a virtual one so that the racialized segregation of the labour market in Canada is naturalized through reference to nationality and citizenship.
Contrary to such claims, migrant workers are not only recruited when and where there is an actual shortage of workers in Canada. Instead, much of this "shortage" is qualitative. It is about recruiting (and indenturing) workers from outside of Canada for jobs that "Canadians" consistently refuse because they can legally and because they have other options, including unemployment and social assistance. It is also about recruiting workers through a category—non-immigrant—that renders these people's unfreedom legal.

Indenturing workers therefore is one of the paramount meanings attached to the classification of some people as migrant workers. Importantly, the articulation of notions of Canadianness with notions of freedom (versus unfreedom) are organized through the operation of this category. Having the ability to work within free employment relationships is one characteristic of being Canadian: the opposite applies to those categorized as migrant workers. The facticity organized by these binary codes that separate migrant workers from Canadians organizes the expectation that differentiated categories of people will, in reality, be treated quite differently by the Canadian state. This is solidified in the following exchange:

Mr. Roch LaSalle (Joliette): ... In view of the statement by the PM. to the effect that some unemployed people would refuse to perform such work, would the PM. consider compelling Canadians to work if they receive any social benefits? Would the government favour legislation requiring any government pension recipient to work? (Hansard, 23 March 1971: 4508, emphasis added).

Right Hon. P.E. Trudeau (PM.): No, . . . the government will not commandeer the work force. The whole political philosophy of the government is based on freedom of choice for citizens to work where they want (Hansard, 23 March 1971: 4508, emphasis added).

This statement highlights what is, ultimately, the crux of the issue. The PM. acknowledges that the Canadian state, at this time, cannot indenture those that it has categorized as its citizens, as the beneficiaries of the existence of Canada itself, at least not without raising serious questions about the liberal democratic character of governance. In the framework of Canadianness it just does not (yet) make common sense to compel Canadians to work where they do not wish to.

Within this same ideological framework, though, people can be exploited as indentured labour in Canada, as evidenced by my previous discussion of the NIEAP. Utilizing liberal democratic ideologies to legitimize the state requires that those made unfree by this same state need to

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18. It is of great import that the ability for formal citizens to access these options is becoming more restrictive. However, while the content of citizenship may be becoming more hollow, the distinction between being a citizen and being a non-citizen within Canada is still of great significance for experiences in the labour force.
be Othered through a classificatory system that deems them as non-citizens. With the non-immigrants or migrant worker category in place, a system of indentured labour in the self-stated liberal, tolerant Canada can proceed.

In this context it is crucial for us to note that nowhere in the preceding debate within the Canadian parliament were any objections raised as to the indenturing of *West Indian* workers on farms in Canada. The fact of a person working as unfree labour was not, in and of itself, the problem. The problem was *who*, citizen or non-immigrant, was going to do the job. As the following statement by MP H.W. Danforth (Kent-Bessex) demonstrates, it is presented as natural that we-Canadians get those foreigners to do this kind of work because, in part, it is natural for Them to do it.

The attitude of this government has been that if you do not want to work, you should not have to do so. I raise this matter because the PM reaffirmed the position of the government that a Canadian should not have to work if he [sic] does not want to. Mr. Chairman, many people do not like to work in agriculture. They do not like the monotony, the conditions and the fact that you work sometimes in heat and sometimes in cold. That is all right; they do not like it and they should not be forced to work at it. We all agree with that. How then do they [farm owners] obtain labour? Many of them have encouraged offshore labour over the years which comes from three sources, the Caribbean, Portugal and Mexico. We need this labour . . . and these people are used to working in the heat. They are used to working in agriculture, and they are satisfied with the pay scale. . . . Everybody is satisfied: the workers are satisfied, the primary producers are satisfied and the consumers of Canada are satisfied because we are getting the crops harvested. . . . I feel that Canadians should provide work for Canadians wherever possible; Canadians should have the first opportunity to work. But . . . if Canadians do not want to work at this job—many of them do not, and have expressed this feeling in no uncertain terms—then I say that the producers of this nation are entitled to offshore, competent labour from wherever it may come, if these people are willing to work under the conditions prevailing in Canada today and produce crops for Canadian consumers (Hansard, 20 July 1973: 5836).

This statement presents as natural notions that there are actual differences between people that make certain people, i.e., "offshore labour" from the Caribbean, Portugal and Mexico legitimate bodies for coercive state actions to be imposed upon. It is also naturalized that they work under conditions that "Canadians" would not subject themselves to. The discursive organization of this statement conceals the social factors that bring certain groups of people to work in clearly substandard (in relation to Canadians) working conditions and pay scales. Rather than showing the unequal social relations that organize these differences in the first place, these material practices are mystified through parliamentary practices that reproduce the ideologies of racism and nationalism that help to hold in place commonsensical notions about the "natural" superiority/inferiority of differentiated groups of people.
When examining the construction of binary codes that organize difference, then, we see that categorizing a person a citizen or a migrant worker is an ideological practice, for the exploitation of migrant workers is concealed and reproduced through the notion that citizens can expect certain rights and entitlements that non-citizens cannot and that this expectation is perfectly "normal." The notion that some people just are citizens and Others just are not, even within the same borders, comes to be a normative stance. The fact that these are realized through the social organization of human relations in a particularly exclusionary and exploitative way is concealed. As a result, it appears perfectly ordinary that those categorized as non-citizens (migrant workers, for example) would be denied those rights and protections that Canadian citizens are seen as solely entitled to. Why should migrant workers get the same rights as citizens? They are, after all, migrant workers. The circularity of the argument ensnares migrant workers (and others classified as non-citizens) in a particularly vicious way.

Conclusion

The social co-ordination of the practices of ruling over migrant workers has involved the creation of national state categories of differentiation that have worked to accomplish, both materially and ideologically, the gendered racialization of class. Consequently, I have argued that the ongoing reproduction of the Canadian "nation" (with its concept of citizenship and, therefore, non-citizenship) has been an integral feature of the restructuring of capitalist labour markets and therefore of capitalist accumulation strategies in this latest period of reorganization. Indeed, some of the processes of globalization in Canada have been put into place through nation-building exercises.

The organization of heightened vulnerability for an ever-growing group of workers in the Canadian labour market is an effect of the exercise of state power in this period of reorganization. Employers benefit enormously from this social organization of difference between people in the labour market. Thus, in a world where the capital of investors is increasingly being granted "national treatment" (i.e., citizenship) rights, the denial of exactly this status to people who are categorized as migrant workers highlights some of the contemporary ways notions of "citizenship" are being materialized.

It is noteworthy, then, that since the beginnings of the current period of capitalist reorganization in Canada there has been an increase in themes of Canadianness. The state's part in this is not insignificant. The

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19. We can see the spread of unemployment relationships to an ever-growing number of people. Various welfare-type programs in New Brunswick, Quebec, Ontario and Alberta require welfare recipients to work or train for work in order to receive their monthly welfare payments (see J. Swanson, Poor-Bashing: The Politics of Exclusion. Toronto: Between the Lines, 2001).
introduction of a new Canadian flag (1967), a new Canadian anthem (1970), the printing of effigies of former Prime Ministers on Canadian money (1970), the replacement of references to Canada being a Dominion to that of an independent nation and the patriation of the Canadian constitution (1982) have all occurred in a period when global relations and flows of capital and people have undergone significant change.

Amidst this increase in the discourse of Canadianness, in which exhortations to “protect Our borders” have been rampant, there has not been a lessening in the movement of people into Canada. Thus, the discourse on Canadianness has not served to actually curtail migration. Rather, state actors have used it to accomplish a substantial shift in the (im)migration status of those admitted to the country. Discourses of Canadianness have operated as an ideological practice of materially organizing difference in Canada by serving to legitimize the denial of citizenship status to most of the people migrating in search of work, thereby making those constituted as migrant workers a more vulnerable work force. The NIEAP, then, is a part of the reproduction of highly differentiated labour markets, organized through the nation-state system, that continue to serve capitalists well in this period of restructuring by making the employment of the much-discussed “cheap labour strategy” possible.

Contrary to government claims, then, those made to live and work as migrant workers in Canada do not consist of a “foreign” work force in Canada, one supposedly working separately from and in opposition to Canadians. Rather, the employment of people as migrant workers is very much a part of the labour force that is offered up to capital investors in Canada. In this sense, citizenship can be thought of as a work process that is located within the social organization of productive relations. In other words non-citizens, because they are socially organized to be more malleable to the will of employers, are the quintessential “flexible” employees. Their vulnerability lies at the heart of the flexible accumulation process of this recent period of globalization.

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